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Android malware has been increasingly identified and organised into families [28, 36], e.g., Geinimi, Basebridge, Spitmo,
Zitmo, and Ginmaster, etc. This human-decided organisation was based on some unexpected behaviours exhibited in
malware instances, e.g., intercept incoming messages then send them out via Internet connections, load classes from
a hidden payload then execute commands from remote servers, and send premium messages constantly, and so on;
and malware instances in one family share some common unexpected behaviours [17, 29]. We study the problem of
verifying Android applications to deny these behaviours. That is, (a) to formalise and learn unexpected behaviours from
malware instances exploiting their family information, so-called anti-security policies; (b) and verify target applications
against these policies efficiently, so as to decide whether a target application has any unexpected behaviour. Our main
contributions are : (a) we implement a static analysis tool to construct an extended Bu¨chi automaton for each Android
application to approximate its behaviours, considering a broad range of features of Java and the Android framework [3];
(b) we develop an efficient machine-learning-centred method to construct sub-automata as anti-security policies from
thousands of malware instances across hundreds of malware families; (c) we demonstrate the effectiveness of anti-
security policy verification by showing how it helps reveal covert channels in a scenario of collusion attacks. We show
that using the verification results against anti-security policies as input features, the classification performance on new
malware detections is improved dramatically, in particular, the precision and recall are respectively 8% and 51% better
than those using APIs calls and permissions as input features. We compare anti-security policies for malware families
to their manual descriptions, which have been produced by malware analysts or third-party researchers [1, 2, 4, 5, 23],
and demonstrate they compare well to these descriptions. This research has several potential benefits, including: help
people get better understanding of potential threats hidden in mobile applications; provide hints for malware analysts
before more expensive investigation; support automatic generation of malware analysis reports; and provide clear and
friendly references for security policy designers, etc.
Formalisation. We characterise an application’s behaviour by an extended Bu¨chi automaton, i.e., finite and infinite
control-sequences of events, actions, and annotated API calls, a so-called behaviour automaton. For example, the au-
tomatonM in Figure 1 tells us: an application will send messages after a user’s action, e.g., click a button, touch the
screen, or long-press a picture, etc., which is denoted by “click”; it tries to access Internet or send messages out when a
short message is received; it also collects your device ID and phone number. All states in this automaton are accepting
states because any prefix of an application’s behaviour is its behaviour as well. We have designed and implemented
M :
// ?>=<89:;76540123q0 MAIN //
SMS RECEIVED

?>=<89:;76540123q1 click // ?>=<89:;76540123q2 AsyncTask: sendTextMessage // ?>=<89:;76540123q3
AsyncTask: sendTextMessage
		
?>=<89:;76540123q4
Receiver: getDeviceId
// ?>=<89:;76540123q5
Receiver: getLine1Number
OO
Receiver: openConnection
// ?>=<89:;76540123q6
Receiver: openConnection
UU
Figure 1: Behaviour Automaton of an Android Application
a static analysis tool to construct such a behaviour automaton from the assembly code of each Android application to
approximate its behaviours. The Android platform tools aapt and dexdump are used to decompile these applications.
To develop such a tool, we have to consider a broad range of features of Java and the Android framework, e.g., multi-
threads, multi-entries, inter-procedural calls, callbacks, component life-cycle, inter-component communications, and
runtime-registered listeners, etc. The choice of which features to include is a trade-off between efficiency and precision.
Automata are much more accurate than the manifest information, e.g., permissions and actions, which can be extracted
from the AndroidManifest.html file of an Android application. Compared with API calls appearing in code, the
extended Bu¨chi automata can capture more sophisticated behaviours. This is needed in practice, because: API calls ap-
pearing in code contain “noise” caused by dead code and libraries; and, some unexpected behaviours only arise when
some API methods are called in certain orders. Also, some complex behaviours, e.g., the life-cycle of Android activity
components, can only be modelled by using infinite sequences. On the other hand, automata are less accurate than
data-flows. However, it is much easier to generate behaviour automata using our tool for applications en masse than
generating data-flows using tools like FlowDroid [10] or Amandroid [32]. In particular, people can annotate appealing
API methods to generate behaviour automata more efficiently, rather than considering all data-dependence between
statements. In our implementation, we use an extension of permission-governed API methods generated by PScout [11]
as annotations.
Learning. An anti-security policy is a common abstract behaviour shared by applications in the same malware fam-
ily. For example, let us consider a malware family called Ggtracker. A brief description of this family, which was
ψ : // ?>=<89:;q0 SMS RECEIVED //
Σ−{click}
		 ?>=<89:;q1 SEND SMS //
Σ−{click}
		 ?>=<89:;76540123q2
Σ−{click}
		
Figure 2: An Anti-Security Policy Learnt from a Malware Family
produced by Symantec [5], is as follows: Android.Ggtracker is a Trojan horse for Android devices that sends SMS messages
to a premium-rate number. It may also steal information from the device. One of anti-security policies we construct from
malware instances in this family is displayed as Figure 2. This policy ψ describes an unexpected behaviour of this fam-
ily: send messages without any user’s interaction after an incoming message is received. We outline our method to
learn anti-security policies as follows. (a) Abstract Behaviour Automata. Since a behaviour might relate to several API
calls, e.g., sendTextMessage, sendDataMessage, and sendMultipartTextMessage are all related to the behaviour of send-
ing messages, to remove this kind of redundancy, we replace API names in a behaviour automaton by permissions or
permission-like phrases without changing any node or transition; this we call the abstract behaviour automaton. For
instance, the abstract behaviour automaton A of the behaviour automatonM is given in Figure 3, in which permission-
governed API methods, e.g., sendTextMessage, getDeviceId, and openConnection, etc., are respectively replaced by
their permissions. For some API methods which are not permission-governed but security-related, e.g., loadClass, load-
Library, and loadUrl, etc., we replace them by pre-defined phrases. (b) Feature Construction. Once an abstract behaviour
A :
// ?>=<89:;76540123q0 MAIN //
SMS RECEIVED

?>=<89:;76540123q1 click // ?>=<89:;76540123q2 SEND SMS // ?>=<89:;76540123q3
SEND SMS
		
?>=<89:;76540123q4
READ PHONE STATE
// ?>=<89:;76540123q5
READ PHONE STATE
OO
INTERNET
// ?>=<89:;76540123q6
INTERNET
UU
Figure 3: Abstract Behaviour Automaton of an Android Application
automaton has been constructed for each malware instance, we want to figure out: for each family, which behaviour
is unexpected and which is normal. But, before any interesting pattern exploration, we have to decide which part of
an application’s behaviour is exclusive to itself and which part is shared with other applications; this we call feature
construction. The space of features, which consists of intersection and difference between abstract behaviour automata,
in theory, is exponential in the number of sample applications. So, we approximate it by searching for a salient sub-
space, e.g., {Aj ∈ {⊕A∈GA | ⊕ ∈ {−,∩}} | wj 6= 0}, which is guided by behavioural difference between malware and
benign applications. Here,wj is the weight assigned to a feature, and a feature is salient if its weight is non-zero. These
weights are assigned by a linear classifier, which is trained from a group G of malware instances mixed with an equal
number of randomly-chosen benign applications, e.g., using L1-Regularized Logistic Regression [18, 30]. (c) Learning
Unexpected Behaviour. An unexpected behaviour is a common behaviour shared by malware instances but rarely seen
in benign applications. If we train a classifier, intuitively, a feature with a negative weight more likely indicates an
unexpected behaviour while a feature with a positive weight more likely indicates a normal behaviour. This observa-
tion leads us to capture unexpected behaviour using features with negative weights. Further, for each malware family,
we want to choose a subset of features so that it largely covers and is strongly associated with malware instances in
this family. Formally, let us write Pr(f |X) to denote the probability of a malware instance belonging to a family f if
this instance has all features from X and Pr(X|f) to denote the probability of having all features from X if a malware
instance belongs to a family f . We adopt Fβ-measure of them as the evaluation function to search for such subsets. A so-
// ?>=<89:;q0 SMS RECEIVED // ?>=<89:;q1 SEND SMS // ?>=<89:;76540123q2 ⇒ ψ : // ?>=<89:;q0 SMS RECEIVED //
Σ−{click}
		 ?>=<89:;q1 SEND SMS //
Σ−{click}
		 ?>=<89:;76540123q2
Σ−{click}
		
Figure 4: Construct an Anti-Security Policy from a Learnt Unexpected Behaviour
constructed unexpected behaviour of the Ggtracker malware family, as an example, is displayed as the left-hand side of
Figure 4. (d) Anti-Security Policies. Many unexpected behaviours identified in target applications will not be the same as
unexpected behaviours learnt from sample malware instances, but they might contain learnt unexpected behaviours as
subsequences. For example, although the unexpected sequence SMS RECEIVED.SEND SMS is not accepted by the ab-
stract behaviour automaton A, this automaton does accept sequences containing SMS RECEIVED.SEND SMS as a sub-
sequence, i.e., SMS RECEIVED. READ PHONE STATE.READ PHONE STATE. SEND SMS.SEND SMS6ω . Here, the
expression SEND SMS.SEND SMS6ω denotes that the application will send text messages several times or infinitely
often. So, if a behaviour contains a learnt unexpected behaviour as a subsequence, we consider this behaviour as un-
expected as well. We call this generalisation of learnt unexpected behaviours anti-security policies, in particular, we
construct them directly from learnt unexpected behaviours by adding an edge labelled with Σ− {click} to each state of
each automaton, shown as the right-hand side of Figure 4. Here, we use Σ to denote the collection of events, actions,
and permission-like phrases.
Verification. Once anti-security policies ψ ∈ P are constructed from sample malware instances across families, we want
to check whether the abstract behaviour automaton A of a target application satisfies the negation of an anti-security
policy, i.e., ∀ψ ∈ P .A |= ¬ψ. Equally, if there exists a ψ ∈ P such that A ∩ ψ 6= ∅, then we consider there is a
security fault in this application with respect to P . For instance, since the intersection between an application’s abstract
behaviour automaton given in Figure 3 and the anti-security policy given in Figure 2 is not empty, we consider this
application is unsafe with respect to {ψ}. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the anti-policy verification, we present a
scenario of collusion attacks exploiting channels created by inter-component-communications and show how to apply
the above verification method to help identify potential threats. There are three roles in this scenario: an agent, a
postman, and an invader. An agent is an application which has permissions to collect information and a postman
is an application with capability of sending information out. They are normally benign applications, e.g., message
managers, email clients, and social network applications, etc. An invader will explore service supplied by agents and
postmen, to steal information without necessity of declaring any permission. As a proof-of-concept we implement some
experimental programs and display their behaviour automata in Figure 5. In this implementation, the invader will
Invader : // ?>=<89:;76540123q0 MAIN // ?>=<89:;76540123q1 GET CONTENT // ?>=<89:;76540123q2 SENDTO // ?>=<89:;76540123q3
SENDTO
		
permissions: ∅
actions: ∅
Agent : // ?>=<89:;76540123q0 GET CONTENT // ?>=<89:;76540123q1 Activity: getSimSerialNumber // ?>=<89:;76540123q2 permissions: {READ PHONE STATE}
actions: {GET CONTENT}
Postman : // ?>=<89:;76540123q0 SENDTO // ?>=<89:;76540123q1 Activity: sendTextMessage // ?>=<89:;76540123q2 permissions: {SEND SMS}
actions: {SENDTO}
Figure 5: An Implementation of the Agent-Invader-Postman Scenario
make use of service supplied by the agent and the postman to collect user’s IMSI number then send it out via SMS. First,
it invokes the API startActivityForResult with a GET CONTENT intent in the callback onCreate of an activity; then it
will invoke the API startActivity with a SENDTO intent in the callback onActivityResult of the same activity, when the
IMSI number is received. Since the invader does not require any permission or action, and except startActivity and
startActivityForResult, it does not invoke any other API method, only considering the invader’s behaviour, there is no
suspicious. However, if we combine behaviour automata through replacing an action by how an application deals with
this action, i.e., GET CONTENT by Activity:getSimSerialNumber and SENDTO by Activity:sendTextMessage, we will
get an abstract behaviour automaton displayed in Figure 6. Given an anti-security policy φ, the intersection between
Agent-Invader-Postman : // ?>=<89:;76540123q0 MAIN // ?>=<89:;76540123q1 READ PHONE STATE // ?>=<89:;76540123q2 SEND SMS // ?>=<89:;76540123q3
SEND SMS
		
φ : // ?>=<89:;q0 READ PHONE STATE //
Σ−{click}
		 ?>=<89:;q1 SEND SMS //
Σ−{click}
		 ?>=<89:;76540123q2
Σ−{click}
		
Figure 6: The Combined Abstract Behaviour Automaton of the Agent-Invader-Postman Scenario
these two automata is not empty. So, an Android environment containing these three applications does have a potential
security fault with respect to the anti-security policies {φ}.
Evaluation. We want to demonstrate that learnt unexpected behaviours can capture most unexpected behaviour exhib-
ited in sample malware instances. We collected around 4,000 identified malware instances from different sources [1, 23,
28]. These malware instances have been manually investigated and organised into around 200 families, e.g., Basebridge,
Spitmo, and Zitmo, etc., by malware analysts or third-party researchers. Some malware families contain hundreds of
instances, e.g., Geinimi, Ginmaster, and Droiddream; some families only contain several instances, e.g., Arspam and
Ggtracker. We collected these human-authored descriptions from online malware analysis reports [1, 2, 4, 5, 23]. By
applying the formalisation and learning approaches we have discussed, for each family unexpected behaviours are con-
structed from its malware instances. We list manual descriptions and learnt unexpected behaviours of several prevalent
families in Table 1. Unexpected behaviours are specified in regular expressions and ω-languages. We use the Greek
letter  to denote the empty string. The expression 6ω means ∗| ω and the expression 6ω+ denotes +| ω . The con-
catenation is extended as usual, i.e., ( ω).α = ω with α ∈ Σ6ω . A subjective comparison shows that learnt unexpected
behaviours are comparable to these manual descriptions. Learnt unexpected behaviours also reveal trigger conditions
of some behaviours, e.g., the expression BOOT COMPLETED.SEND SMS denotes that after the device finishes booting
this application will send a message out, the expression UMS CONNECTED.LOAD CLASS means that when a USB
massive storage is connected to the device this application will load some code from a library or a payload, and the
unexpected behaviour for Droiddream shows that if the phone state changes this application will collect information
then access Internet, etc. Within manual descriptions displayed in Table 1, only two behaviours are not captured by
learnt unexpected behaviours, i.e., gain root access for Droiddream and the behaviour of Spitmo. Some anti-security
Family Manual Description
Learnt Unexpected Behaviour in Regular Expressions and ω-Languages
The letter  denotes the empty string, the expression 6ω means ∗| ω , and 6ω+ denotes +| ω .
Arspam Sends spam SMS messages to contacts on the compro-mised device [5]. 1. BOOT COMPLETED . SEND SMS
Anserverbot Downloads, installs, and executes payloads [1].
1. UMS CONNECTED . LOAD CLASS6ω . (ACCESS NETWORK STATE |
READ PHONE STATE | INTERNET) . (ACCESS NETWORK STATE |
READ PHONE STATE | INTERNET |LOAD CLASS)6ω
Basebridge Forwards confidential details (SMS, IMSI, IMEI) to a re-mote server [2]. Downloads and installs payloads [1, 5].
1. UMS CONNECTED . (INTERNET |LOAD CLASS |
READ PHONE STATE |ACCESS NETWORK STATE)6ω+
Cosha Monitors and sends certain information to a remote lo-cation [5].
1. MAIN . click . (click |ACCESS FINE LOCATION |DIAL)6ω . DIAL .
(click |ACCESS FINE LOCATION |DIAL)6ω . (INTERNET | )
2. SMS RECEIVED . (INTERNET |ACCESS FINE LOCATION)6ω+
Droiddream
Gains root access, gathers information (device ID, IMEI,
IMSI) from an infected mobile phone and connects to
several URLs in order to upload this data [1, 2].
1. PHONE STATE . (ACCESS NETWORK STATE |READ PHONE STATE6ω+ .
INTERNET) . (ACCESS NETWORK STATE | INTERNET)6ω
Fakelogo Sends SMS messages to premium rate numbers [4].
1. BOOT COMPLETED . RUN6ω
+
2. BOOT COMPLETED . READ PHONE STATE6ω
+
3. MAIN . click . SEND SMS . (SEND SMS | )
4. MAIN . SEND SMS
Geinimi Monitors and sends certain information to a remote lo-cation [5].
1.  |MAIN . click6ω+ . VIBRATE . (click |VIBRATE)6ω . RESTART PACKAGES .
(MAIN . (click |VIBRATE)6ω . RESTART PACKAGES)6ω
2. BOOT COMPLETED . (ACCESS NETWORK STATE | click | INTERNET |
RESTART PACKAGES |ACCESS FINE LOCATION)6ω+
Ggtracker Monitors received SMS messages and intercepts SMSmessages [2]
1. MAIN . READ PHONE STATE
2. SMS RECEIVED . SEND SMS
Ginmaster
Sends received SMS messages to a remote server [23].
Downloads and installs applications without user con-
cern [23].
1. BOOT COMPLETED . LOAD CLASS
2. MAIN . SEND SMS
Spitmo Filters SMS messages to steal banking confirmationcodes [5]. 1. NEW OUTGOING CALL . READ PHONE STATE . INTERNET . (INTERNET | )
Zitmo
Opens a backdoor that allows a remote attacker to steal
information from SMS messages received on the com-
promised device [5].
1. SMS RECEIVED . SEND SMS
2. MAIN . READ PHONE STATE
3. MAIN . SEND SMS
Table 1: Learnt Unexpected Behaviour versus Manual Description of Malware Families
policies in LTL [24] which are constructed from these unexpected behaviours are as follows:
G (¬click ∧ (SMS RECEIVED→ F SEND SMS)) (from Ggtracker and Zitmo);
G (¬click ∧ (UMS CONNECTED→ F (LOAD CLASS ∨ INTERNET ∨ READ PHONE STATE))) (from Basebridge);
G (¬click ∧ (BOOT COMPLETED→ F SEND SMS)) (from Arspam);
G (¬click ∧ (BOOT COMPLETED→ F RESTART PACKAGES)) (from Geinimi);
G (¬click ∧ (PHONE STATE→ F (READ PHONE STATE→ F INTERNET))) (from Droiddream).
They reveal the main unexpected behaviours exhibited in malware instances of these families: (a) intercept incoming
messages (and calls) and send them out to remote servers; (b) (download and) run code in hidden payloads (then
execute commands from C&C servers); (c) collect personal information, e.g., locations, IMEI, IMSI, and MAC addresses,
and so on; (d) send (premium) SMS messages.
We also want to show that verifying anti-security policies helps improve the robustness of malware classifications.
We collected 3, 000 malware instances which have been discovered before 2014 and 3, 000 randomly-chosen benign
applications. They include all malware instances from the Malware Genome Project [1, 36] and most malware instances
from the Mobile-Sandbox [9, 27]. These malware instances have been manually investigated and organised into around
200 families by third-party researchers [1, 27, 36] and malware analysts [2, 4, 5, 23]. By reading online malware analysis
reports [1, 2, 4, 5, 23] of these families, we understand what bad things happen in these malware instances. We divided
them into the training set and the validation set. Each of them includes 1, 500 malware instances across all families
and 1, 500 benign applications. We collected 1, 500 malware instances which were discovered in 2014 and randomly
chose 1, 500 benign applications, to form the testing set. These malware instances were from the Intel Security and
have been investigated by malware analysts, but there is no family information, i.e., we have no idea of unexpected
behaviours of these malware instances. We extracted permissions and API calls from these applications as input features.
We constructed behaviour automata for these applications then applied the method discussed earlier to learn anti-
security policies from malware instances in the training set. We applied the verification method discussed earlier to
check whether an application satisfies the negation of an anti-security policy. We collected these verification results
as input features as well. We adopt the L1-Regularized Logistic Regression [20, 30] as the training method, then train
and test classifiers using different combinations of features. The classification performance is reported in Table 2. The
singletons denote labels extracted from the edges of abstract behaviour automata and a pair (f, g) denotes that f. g is
a subsequence of a sequence which is accepted by the automaton of an anti-security policy. It confirms: (a) Anti-
security policies dramatically improve the classification performance on new malware instances. The classification
performance using API calls and permissions as input features is very good on the validation set, i.e., the precision and
recall are respectively 93% and 98%. However, this is just an over-fitting to the training set, since its performance on
the testing set is bad, i.e., the precision is 65% and recall is 15%. This means that a lot of new unexpected behaviours
cannot be captured by API calls and permissions. By using the verification results against anti-security policies as input
features, we improve the precision to 73% and the recall to 66%. (b) The generalisation from unexpected behaviours
to anti-security policies helps improve the classification performance. (c) The family information helps improve the
feature
validation set testing set
#salient/#feature
precision recall FPR FNR precision recall FPR FNR
syntax-based features
permissions 89% 99% 17% 0.8% 53% 21% 19% 79% 59/175
apis 91% 98% 12% 2% 61% 15% 9% 85% 1443/52432
apis & permissions 93% 98% 10% 2% 65% 15% 8% 85% 735/52607
semantics-based features
unexpected behaviours 66% 91% 64% 9% 53% 74% 65% 26% 634/886
singletons 73% 90% 45% 10% 64% 72% 40% 28% 85/87
pairs 68% 92% 59% 8% 55% 69% 57% 31% 344/7568
policies 75% 87% 10% 13% 69% 66% 30% 34% 581/886
singletons & policies 76% 90% 37% 10% 70% 67% 28% 33% 963/973
policies for families 72% 72% 38% 28% 73% 66% 25% 34% 131/131
singletons & policies for families 76% 88% 38% 12% 70% 67% 29% 33% 214/218
mixed features
all 95% 99.5% 7.7% 0.5% 65% 7.5% 4% 92.4% 870/61149
Table 2: Classification performance using different features. (FPR—False Positive Ratio. FNR—False Negative Ratio.)
classification performance on new malware detections, not only the usual mesaures, e.g., precision and recall, but also
the minimum number of features which are actually used in a linear classifier, i.e., totally 131 features in policies for
families were used, rather than 581 features in policies.
Conclusion. Machine learning methods have been applied in Android malware detection [6, 12, 15, 17, 19, 35], cluster-
ing [29] and simple explanation [9] of malicious behaviour. However, learning simple, understandable, and verifiable
properties from identified malware instances is more challenging and has not yet been considered. To the best of our
knowledge, our approach is the first one to automatically construct anti-security policies from Android malware in-
stances exploiting their family information. We show that these learnt anti-security policies can be used for verification,
to improve the classification performance on new malware detections, and to help people’s understanding of malicious
behaviours in these families. The idea of characterising applications’ behaviours as automata is similar with the be-
haviour abstraction in [13, 33]. Abstract behaviour automata are close to permission-event graphs [16], embedded call
graphs [19], and behaviour graphs [34]. But, none of them has been exploited to generate verifiable properties. Anti-
security policies we have constructed can be considered as instances of security automata [25] and safety and liveness
properties [7]. Our verification approach is the same as the automata-theoretic model checking [31]. More sophisticated
approaches can be found in a recent study of LTL-model checking [26]. Some benign and malicious properties specified
in LTL were verified against hundreds of Android applications in [16]. Also, totally 19 malicious properties for Android
applications were manully constucted and specified as first-order LTL formulae in [21]. Unfortunately, these prop-
erties were manually composed. Anti-security policies which are automatically constructed from malware instances,
compared with manually-composed properties, will be easier to be updated on the changes of unexpected behaviours
exhibited in new malware families. Among others, Angluin’s [8] and Biermann’s [14] algorithms were developed to
learn regular expressions from sample finite strings. To apply similar ideas in anti-security policy construction, we have
to extend these algorithms to learn Bu¨chi automata from infinite strings, which is an open problem [22], not to mention it
is hard to extract enough finite and infinite strings from abstract behaviour automata. Since learnt anti-security policies
are restricted to the family information of malware instances and many malware instances have no family informa-
tion, in further work, we want to construct security as well as anti-security policies by exploring behavioural difference
between benign applications and malware, especially when the family information is unavailable.
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